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What happens to autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections? Autocrats gain a 
key benefit by holding competitive elections: a better post-tenure fate. Accord-ing to my 
argument, autocrats who introduce competitive elections receive implicit or explicit 
assurances that they will be able to leave office and retire peacefully. By contrast, failing 
to hold a competitive election is more likely to result in a violent re-moval such as 
execution, prosecution, and/or foreign intervention. The paper tests the argument by 
analyzing a cross-national dataset of autocrats’ fates between 1960-2004, and the results 
provide evidence that autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections are more likely 
to lose power peacefully, and the result holds regardless of regime types.
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1 Introduction
The introduction of political institutions such as multiparty elections, political parties,
legislatures, and constitutions may not be just “window-dressing” for autocratic leaders. In-
stead, implementing such reforms, some argue, helps autocrats retain power, because they 
appear to increase legitimacy, placate citizens, and satisfy members of the opposition (Al-
bertus and Menaldo 2012; Blaydes 2011; Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and
Kim 2010; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; 2007; Lust-Okar 2006;
Magaloni 2006; Wright 2008).1 While many scholars have attempted to illuminate what 
happens to autocratic regimes after the introduction of such political institutions, what hap-
pens to autocratic leaders who approve their adoption remains murky. This paper examines 
leaders’ fates by focusing on one democratic institution - competitive elections, defined as a 
contest with at least two candidates on the ballot - and asks what happens to dictators who 
hold a competitive election.2
For some autocrats, introducing a competitive election is a gamble. In the Philippines in 
1986, Nicaragua in 1990, Zambia in 1991, and Madagascar in 2001, leaders lost elections that 
they introduced, and failed to remain in power. Further, even for those who win an election, 
the introduction of competition may have a destabilizing effect on the regime and shorten its 
duration (Brownlee 2007, Howard and Roessler 2006, Lindberg 2009, Tucker 2007). And the 
risks do not end with the election outcome: after losing power between 1946 and 2004, 47% of 
dictators faced dire outcomes such as imprisonment, killings, execution, and exile (Escribà-
Folch 2013). Yet in spite of the risks, many autocrats engage in competitive elections: 136
1There are some counter-arguments. See, for example, Wright and Escribà-Folch (2012).
2In this article, competitive elections under dictatorship and semi-competitive elections are used inter-
changeably. Competitive elections do not necessarily mean that elections are free and fair, but in this paper, a 
competitive election has to satisfy all three of the following criteria: opposition is allowed; there is more than 
one legal party legal; and there is a choice of candidates on the ballot. The criteria can be determined before an 
election, while evaluating whether elections were free and fair is difficult and can be done only ex-post (Hyde 
and Marinov 2012). See also Diamond (2002); Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009); Levitsky and Way (2002; 2010) 
and Schedler (2002; 2013) about the concept of competitive elections.
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competitive elections were held in autocratic regimes between 1960 and 2004.
To illuminate why, I extend autocratic leaders’ time horizons to the period following their 
rule, the post-tenure period, and argue that while autocratic leaders may not be able to secure 
a long tenure by introducing competitive elections, they can secure a safe exit -by which I 
mean that autocrats can avoid violent removal such as prosecution, execution, exile, and/or 
foreign intervention when they lose power. In other words, the possibility or guarantee of post-
tenure political survival following competitive elections is a substantial pay-off for autocrats 
who introduce competitive elections.
With this motivation in mind, I present a theory of how holding competitive elections 
leads to better post-tenure fates for autocrats. My central argument is that by holding 
competitive elections, autocrats can receive implicit or explicit assurances about their post-
tenure retirement. Implicitly, competitive elections generate legitimacy for autocrats, which 
makes it more difficult for other actors to punish them than their counterparts who do not 
hold competitive elections. Elections have become common practice in the world, and the 
international community and domestic movements alike demand that autocrats hold elections 
(Staniland 2014). Accordingly, if an autocrat concedes and holds a competitive election, 
domestic actors will find it more difficult to punish him and international actors will face a 
disincentive to do so, to avoid deterring others from holding elections. As a result, the 
autocrat who implements a competitive election will face fewer threats to a peaceful post-
tenure fate. Autocrats can also hold a competitive election in exchange for an explicit 
reassurance that he can retire peacefully, in the form of immunity from prosecution or a new 
political position. The implications of both implicit and explicit reassurance are that autocrats 
who hold competitive elections should be more likely to enjoy a safe retirement.
Using cross-national data on elections and autocrats’ post-tenure fates, I test the argu-
ment. Estimating the effect of competitive elections on autocrats’ post-tenure fates is not 
straightforward, because there is a concern that those who introduce competitive elections
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are systematically different from those who do not, and the elections adopters are already 
more likely to enjoy a peaceful exit. To address these concerns, the empirical analyses estimate 
the impact of competitive elections on autocrats’ post-election fates while holding observables 
constant, and rely on entropy balancing to adjust imbalances in covariates (Hain-mueller 
2012). In other words, this paper estimates whether the “treatment” (i.e., holding a 
competitive election) provides a better post-tenure fate than the “control” (i.e., not holding 
such an election). The analyses show that autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections 
have a better post-tenure fate than those who do not.
Other work such as Cox (2009) and Escribà-Folch (2013) broadly examine autocratic 
leaders and track outgoing leaders in transition. However, by focusing on the impact of 
competitive elections on post-tenure fates of autocratic leaders and employing a more rigorous 
inference strategy, this paper shows that competitive elections enable autocrats to secure 
better post-tenure fates. This finding holds regardless of regime type. While regimes with a 
political party system may be less likely to punish autocrats (Cox 2009; Geddes et al. 2014; 
Escribà-Folch 2013), this paper shows that holding competitive elections can help autocrats 
improve their post-tenure fates even in regimes without political parties: compared to not 
holding competitive elections, competitive elections reduce the likelihood that other actors 
will seek to punish the autocrat.
The paper also suggests that learning about the fates of dictators provides new insights 
into autocrats’ decisions at critical points when political liberalization becomes possible. First, 
revealing the importance of ex-post political survival for an autocrat may affect the likelihood 
of holding a competitive election. Though some scholars contend that the spread of human 
rights norms could be counter-productive for political development (e.g., Escribà-Folch and 
Wright 2012; Mchangama and Verdirame 2013), my argument indicates a more nuanced 
association: the threat of international prosecution for human rights violations does not 
prevent autocrats from liberalizing; rather, they may be more likely to introduce reforms
3
and step down in exchange for immunity. Further, shifting the explanatory unit to leaders and 
discussing the possible path of leadership change under autocracy contributes to the recent 
literature of regime types (Geddes et al. 2014; Schuler et al. 2013), because holding 
competitive elections tends to result in political liberalization in the long-term (Howard and 
Roessler 2006, Lindberg 2009). This, in turn, suggests that offering better post-tenure fates 
after competitive elections may increase the chance of political liberalization.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the literature and outlines the 
paper’s hypotheses to explain variation in autocrats’ post-tenure fates. Section three outlines 
my research design, and section four presents the empirical analyses. Finally, section five 
concludes by discussing policy implications and the contributions of the paper.
2 Competitive Election and Post-tenure Fates
This paper argues that holding competitive elections leads to a key benefit for autocrats: a 
safer retirement. In most theoretical frameworks, the choice that dictators face is whether to 
retain power or step down, and losing office results in zero or negative payoff (e.g., Tullock 
1987). Following this logic, if competitive elections lead to a shorter tenure and autocrats 
eventually lose power (e.g., Howard and Roessler 2006), then they have an incentive to hold 
completive elections only when a revolutionary threat is imminent (e.g., Cox 2009; Geddes 
2006). However, some scholars suggest that there are important cases in which autocrats 
introduce competitive elections because they are reassured about their post-tenure fates, and 
the payoff associated with losing power is non-zero, or positive (e.g., Przeworski 1988).3 On 
the other hand, a growing number of former autocratic leaders have faced criminal 
prosecutions (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2012; Kim and Sikkink 2010). Escribà-Folch and
3A similar argument has been offered by other scholars (Cox 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2009). Cox 
(2009), for instance, argues that autocratic regimes hold competitive elections in order to gain information that 
would reduce the risk of violent removal from office via a coup d’état or revolution.
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Wright (2012) argue that prosecutions of dictators increase the cost of leaving office due to 
past human rights violations and the possibility of facing prosecution, and contemporary 
autocrats are less likely to step down.
I argue that a dictator’s dilemma is not the choice to retain power or step down, but: (1) 
either not to hold a competitive election, retain power as long as possible, and eventually 
face a “high-risk” exit; or (2) to hold a competitive election and avoid a high-risk exit, 
even though it may shorten how long the autocrat retains power. Here, I consider three 
exit possibilities as high-risk: exile, prosecution in domestic and international courts, or 
execution. In other words, I argue that there is a strong association between competitive 
elections and the avoidance of such high-risk exits.
How does holding a competitive election lead to an improved post-tenure fate for au-
tocrats? Schelling (1966) suggests that in order for an autocrat to hold an election, an implicit 
or explicit reassurance has to be offered to an autocrat so that his payoff for losing power 
becomes non-zero. I identify two types of reassurance autocrats can receive through 
competitive elections: (1) legitimacy; and (2) an explicit pact.
First, competitive elections can generate international and domestic legitimacy for au-
tocrats (Alagappa 1995). Autocrats can secure better post-tenure fates because holding a 
competitive election increases their reputation as politicians and even after they lose power, 
they can be respected as a “good” politician who followed the rule of law and held a com-
petitive election. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, Western democracies have made it 
clear that they prefer governments elected through competitive elections (Beaulieu and Hyde 
2009; Marinov and Goemans 2013).4 Such a policy posture makes it relatively more difficult 
for other actors to punish autocrats who hold competitive elections, because the international 
community does not want to deter other autocrats from holding elections.
4Their argument is based on the existence of international election observers but it is highly correlated 
with whether or not an election is competitive.
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This legitimacy-generating effect can happen even for unpopular dictators. For example,
after 10 years of repressive rule, by holding the first competitive election in a decade, Ghana’s
president Rawlings gained respect and stepped down as the guardian of a democratic tran-
sition. Though holding competitive elections does not provide autocrats with immunity for 
past crimes, I expect that domestic and international actors are less likely to punish autocrats
who hold competitive elections, as opposed to those who lack electoral legitimacy.5
Some autocrats may feel insecure about their retirement plan if they do not have explicit
reassurances. Without a third party to ensure a safe retirement, the autocrats may not trust
that holding a competitive election will pay off (North 1990; North and Weingast 1989; Olsen
1993; Weingast 1997). In this case, autocrats can leverage a promise of elections in exchange 
for a pact that can provide an explicit reassurance. This type of reassurance typically
includes an immunity clause in the constitution, a pact between between autocrats and the
opposition, or a new position in the government that sometimes involves lifetime immunity.
Przeworski (1988) calls these types of explicit pacts “negotiated transitions to democracy,”
in which political institutions protect interests associated with the authoritarian regimes,
and thus minimize the extent of eventual transformations.6 For instance, Rawlings of Ghana 
wrote a new constitution in 1989, two years before his first competitive elections, which gave
members of the regime immunity from domestic prosecution following a transition.
In exchange for holding a competitive election, outgoing dictators can also receive a new
position in the government. As a result of negotiations with the opposition, for example,
5In addition to the reputation benefits of legitimacy, some contemporary autocrats have access to mone-
tary benefits. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, founded by the Sudanese billionaire, gives multi-million dollar 
awards to African leaders who are elected to office, promote democracy, do not steal from the people, and 
cede power peacefully. The aim of the Ibrahim Prize is to induce African leaders to ensure that they do not 
remain in office because they lack a retirement plan. Recipients receive five million dollars over ten years, 
and a lifetime grant of two hundred thousand dollars annually. The prize was first awarded in 2007, to 
Joaquim Chissano, the former President of Mozambique. Festus Mogae of Botswana won the prize in 2008 
(Auletta 2011).
6Some scholars suggest that these explicit pacts between elites sometimes facilitate successful transitions 
to democracy, by sharing office and/or distributing the rents of office (Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992; 
Karl 1990).
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General Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland gained a post in the government – Jaruzelski convened
talks to negotiate a transition process, and held a competitive election in 1989, which paved
the way toward democratization. Although he resigned from power then, Jaruzelski held the
newly created post of president following the election.7 Regardless of title, a new post in 
the government may also come with lifetime immunity from prosecution. Though it turned
out to be unsuccessful in the end, Augusto Pinochet of Chile was initially provided lifetime
tenure as a senator and thus immunity from any legal action by the Chilean constitution
written by his regime.8
Explicit or implicit reassurance may motivate autocrats to hold a competitive election 
because they will have a “safe exit” and retirement compared to if they tried to retain 
power otherwise. While implicit reassurance (i.e., legitimacy) and explicit reassurance (e.g., 
constitutions) are distinct, the observable implications are the same: both can to a better 
post-tenure fate for an autocrats. This could hold even if it leads to a shorter tenure for the 
autocrat. Accordingly, competitive elections are likely to result in better post-tenure fates 
for autocrats.
This safe exit argument is especially relevant in the contemporary international system, 
in which dictators are not necessarily “safe” internationally or domestically after they lose 
power. The international community is developing accepted mechanisms for holding au-
tocrats responsible for past human rights violations or misdeeds against citizens, with the 
creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its predecessors, the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR). Once autocrats step down from power, they may be prosecuted by inter-
7He then stepped down after one-term, and a general election was held to choose his successor. By contrast, 
Nicolae Ceaus
, escu of Romania was General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party from 1965 to 1989, 
but his regime suddenly collapsed due to anti-government protests in December 1989. Although he tried to flee 
the country, he was eventually captured and executed.
8See Albertus and Menaldo (2014) for discussion and analysis of the role of constitutions in democratic 
transitions.
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national courts for past human rights violations or misdeeds against their citizens.9
At the same time, political liberalization by elections has become a mode of transition, 
and elections are now considered the hallmark of democracy and promoted by the inter-
national community (Lindberg 2006). Holding a competitive election may not only protect 
against international prosecution, but may also deter international actors from intervening in 
the state. As discussed previously, the international community may be reluctant to topple 
autocrats who hold competitive elections, because they have more international and domestic 
legitimacy than those who do not hold competitive elections, and intervention might create 
strong disincentives for other autocrats to implement elections. Based on the same logic, I 
expect the following to be true: those who hold competitive elections are less likely to be 
removed by foreign forces than those who do not hold such elections.
Here, it is important to note that there are some broad conditions under which the argu-
ment may not be applicable; in particular, some autocrats may not need to hold competitive 
elections because they already have decent post-tenure fates. For example, if the incumbents 
are confident of no violent removal, they may not hold costly and risky competitive elections 
to secure political survival after losing power. Since the established succession system can 
lower the likelihood of violent exit of autocratic leaders (Escribà-Folch 2013; Geddes et al. 
2014), autocrats in such a system may not hold competitive elections. Escribà-Folch (2013) in 
particular argues that an established succession system facilitates post-tenure political 
survival of autocrats, because it is possible for outgoing dictators to remain in the ruling 
coalition in such regimes with institutionalized procedures for leadership succession. Yet, even 
in regimes with an established succession system or in non-personalist regimes, this paper 
argues that if the incumbent leader is not sure about his post-tenure fate, he will be better off 
holding a competitive election because it can generate better retirement options.
9Whereas the majority of prosecutions used to be domestic, international prosecutions have increased 
over time, and they outnumbered domestic trials at the end of 2000s (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2012).
8
Thus, I expect that regardless of regime type, competitive elections lead to better post-tenure
fates for autocrats. For example, Kaunda of Zambia introduced a competitive election in
1991 in which he lost to the opposition candidate Chiluba. Although Zambia did not have
an established succession system at the time, Kaunda did not face dire outcomes such as 
execution and exile.
This argument speaks to the literature about why autocrats hold competitive elections.
Competitive elections may not be a fair gamble, and the incumbents may win them in most
cases (Przeworski 2015; Svolik 2012), but we know that some incumbent autocrats do suffer
electoral defeats (Huntington 1991; Kaminsky 1999; Schuler et al. 2013). Further, when 
autocrats win, they tend to suffer from long-term destabilizing effects of competitive elections 
such as a mobilized opposition (e.g., Howard and Roessler 2006). Competitive elections are 
also costly, because once a competitive election is introduced, autocrats typically need to 
increase the vote-buying effort to secure coalition members’ loyalty, as well as to reach other 
supporters from expanded political bases. For example, Magaloni’s (2006) work on Mexico 
demonstrates that elites need to mobilize support by distributing public goods so that lower-
level politicians remain loyal to the party.10 However, despite the risks and costs associated 
with competitive elections, autocrats hold competitive elections. I argue that one overlooked 
reason is that competitive elections increase the probability that autocrats can retire 
peacefully.11
In sum, autocrats can secure better post-tenure fates by holding competitive elections 
10Similar to Magaloni’s point, Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) selectorate theory shows that in order to 
satisfy a large number of voters, the incumbents have an incentive to provide more public goods rather than 
private goods. As an extension of the argument, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) argue that an increase in 
public goods provision is paradoxically detrimental to incumbents because the provision of core public goods, 
such as freedom of assembly, free press, free speech, and transparent government, facilitates the organization of 
the opposition. This suggests that even after successfully distributing enough benefits to supporters and 
winning the election, the leader may still suffer because those efforts could impair her tenure over the long-term 
by empowering opposition groups (see also Gallagher and Hanson 2013).
11Although this paper does not examine this empirically, the Appendix provides further theoretical dis-
cussion.
9
because it tends to increase legitimacy or involve explicit pacts for immunity, relative to not
holding competitive elections. While we do not have data for explicit pacts and it is difficult
to measure legitimacy, if the argument is correct, we should observe that holding competitive
elections leads to better post-tenure fates for autocrats. Further, the second implication is 
that competitive elections are likely to result in less international intervention because it is
difficult for the international community to topple dictators who hold a competitive election,




To examine whether competitive elections increases the likelihood of better post-tenure 
fates, I employ a multinomial logit model, where I distinguish between the risk of safe removal 
and violent removal, comparing both to the reference category of staying in power. To test 
the implication on international intervention, I further divide the violent removal category 
into two: violent removal driven by domestic forces and violent removal by foreign forces. 
In other words, the polychotomous dependent variable measures whether an autocrat stays 
in power, loses power safely, loses power violently by domestic forces, or loses power 
violently by foreign forces.12
Estimating the effect of competitive elections is intrinsically difficult because we cannot 
observe what would have happened if a leader did not hold a competitive election as opposed 
to if the leader does hold one. In other words, we cannot observe the same leader’s behavior
12With the same dataset, I conduct an analysis of whether holding a competitive election shortens auto-
crats’ tenure length, and I find that an autocrat who holds a competitive election has a shorter tenure than the 
counterpart who does not hold such an election. This is consistent with my argument as well as previous 
studies (Howard and Roessler 2006; Schuler et al. 2013).
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both with and without a competitive election. Given this difficulty, I compare the post-
tenure fates of leaders who hold a competitive election with those who did not hold such an
election. Furthermore, considering that observed differences in autocrats could account for
holding a competitive election (and therefore their post-tenure fates), I employ an entropy 
balancing method to control for imbalances in covariates (Hainmueller 2012). Entropy bal-
ancing re-weights covariates in the control group so that the treatment and control group
share the same mean and variance (and possibly skewness) in the covariates. Then, entropy
balancing searches for the set of weights that remains as close as possible to uniform weights
(Hainmueller 2012).13 In the following analyses, the weights are selected so that the control 
group has the same mean and variance as the treatment group for all covariates. Then, I 
estimate the average treatment effect of competitive elections with the weights obtained in the 
first step. Further, I also control for all the covariates used in the first step to account for 
unexplained variance in the dependent variable. Below, I report both the results of the 
multinomial logic analyses with and without entropy balancing.
3.2 Data
The dependent variables come from the Archigos dataset, which contains information on 
the post-tenure fate of dictators (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). Specifically, I 
construct two dependent variables by relying on the dataset’s “exit” variable, which differen-
tiates types of exit modes into “Regular,” “Irregular,” and “Foreign.”14 The first dependent
variable has three categories (i.e, 0=“Stay in Power”; 1=“Regular Exit”; and 2=“Irregular
13In addition, entropy balancing’s single-step iterative process to find a proper set of background character-
istics is more efficient than propensity score matching’s manually iterative search for balances in covariates. 
Note that entropy balancing directly calculates weights to balance covariates in the control group for known 
sample distributions, while propensity score matching methods indirectly estimate a propensity of a treat-
ment through a logistic or probit regression (Hainmueller and Xu 2013). Generally, entropy balancing is 
considered more effective than common propensity score matching methods, because it improves the balance 
across all covariates.
14The variable has another category “Natural Death or Suicide,” and the current analysis treats the 
category as “Regular” exit.
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Exit”), while the second variable has four categories (i.e, 0=“Stay in Power”; 1=“Regular
Exit”; 2=“Domestic-driven irregular Exit”; and 3=“Foreign-driven irregular Exit”).15
The independent variable of interest, Competitive Election, is drawn from the National
Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012).
Following Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug (2013), I define elections as competitive when op-
position was allowed (NELDA3), more than one party was legal (NELDA4), and there was
a choice of candidates on the ballot (NELDA5). I code the variable 1 if all three conditions
are met, and 0 otherwise. I only consider national-level elections (i.e., presidential or parlia-
mentary or constituent assembly elections) and the time period ranges from 1960 to 2004,
when the NELDA and Archigos datasets overlap.
To minimize concerns that omitted variables could bias the results, I include a set of con-
trol variables associated with dictators’ post-election fates. First, I account for the different
types of dictatorship defined by Geddes et al. (2014). These categories include monarchies,
military regimes, one-party, and personalist regimes.16 Second, for economic covariates, I
rely on the Penn World Tables v6.3 and include the logarithm of the 3-year moving average
of a country’s per capita GDP (3yr Mean ln(GDP per capita)) and the 3-year moving average 
of its population (3yr Mean ln(Population)). Further, I account for political conditions that
autocrats face by including the 3-year moving average of polity scores (3yr Mean Polity),
ethnic fractionalization data (Ethnic Fractionalization) (Fearon 2003), and human rights
violations (Adjusted HR Violations). As previous studies argue, ethnic fractionalization or
15While I use the “exit” variable as a proxy for post-tenure fates of autocratic leaders, the Archigos dataset 
has another variable called Post Tenure Fate which may be a more direct proxy. However, when the variable is 
recoded into the current analysis’ time-series format, the variable becomes an identical variable as the exit 
variable (Chi-square=1717.399, p<0.001) except one value (i.e., -999 in the post tenure fate variable, which is 
a missing value because leaders lost office in the year when the data collection ended and they could not track 
their fates). This means that those who have the value of “Irregular” exit almost alway have violent post-
tenure fates such as exile, prosecution or execution in the post-tenure fate variable, while those who have the 
value of “Regular” exit almost always have non-violent post-tenure fates in the post-tenure fate variable.
16As a robustness check, I also test other specifications by using Hadenius and Teorell (2007)’s regime type 
variable, but I find that the results are largely similar (not reported).
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polarization may affect economic performance of autocrats and the risk of civil conflicts,
thereby influencing post-tenure fates of autocrats (Horowitz 1985; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005). Human rights violations are included to indirectly control for autocrats’
popularity – those who have better human rights records should have better post-tenure 
fates. I use the adjusted, latent human rights variables estimated by Fariss (2014).
To control for whether competitive elections take place in the Cold War or post-Cold War
period, I code 1 if the election is after 1990, and 0 otherwise (Cold War). The variable is also
expected to capture a possible enhanced relationship between foreign aid and democratiza-
tion after the Cold War (Dunning 2004; Marinov and Goemans 2013; Wright 2009). All the 
models also include a variable indicating whether a country holds a non-competitive election 
(Non-competitive Election). I also include two dictator-level variables: dictators’ age 
(Age), and how they take power (Entry Mode). To control for time dependence, I 
include three cubic splines and another variable measuring elapsed time since the 
occurrence of event, suggested by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).17
Table 1 reports summary statistics, and Figure A in Appendix compares the means in 
the treatment and control group (before and after entropy balancing). After the re-weighting 
based on entropy balancing, the means in the control group are balanced with the means in 
the treatment group.
[Table 1 about here]
17The use of time dummies to control for time dependence may raise a problem of inefficiency (Beck, Katz, 
and Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010). Instead, splines do not lead to inefficiency nor data separation, 
and allow us to smooth the relationship between the dependent variable and time by creating a smooth 
function of time. Finally, following previous studies (Brownlee 2009; Howard and Roessler 2006; Przeworski et 
al. (1999), I drop democracies from the analysis using Cheibub et al. (2010).
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4 Empirical Analyses
First, a bivariate analysis suggests that those who hold competitive elections have safer 
post-tenure fates than their counterparts who do not hold competitive elections. Between 
1946 and 2004, 63.5% of autocrats who hold competitive elections have safe retirements, 
while 39.7% of those who do not hold competitive elections have the same safe retirements 
and the rest have high risk exit.18
I now consider multivariate analyses. Table 2 provides results for whether competitive 
elections lead to a better post-tenure fate for the incumbent. Model 1 considers the trichoto-
mous dependent variable, while Model 2 adds a foreign intervention outcome to the depen-
dent variable. The multinomial logit analyses find that the Competitive Election variable 
leads to “Regular” exit (i.e., the first columns of the models), while they are not associated 
with “Irregular” exit (i.e., the second column of the model). Since it is difficult to interpret 
multinomial logit coefficients directly, and the significance of coefficients will depend on the 
outcomes compared, I calculate the implied substantive results. In terms of predicted prob-
abilities, according to Model 1 of Table 2, holding a competitive election results in a roughly 
35% increase in the probability of a regular exit.
[Table 2 about here]
Model 2 tests the likelihood of foreign intervention across autocrats who hold competitive 
elections and those who do not. I expect that holding a competitive election makes it more 
difficult for international actors to intervene in domestic politics. Again, the analysis finds 
that competitive elections tend to result in autocrats’ safe exit. In substantive terms, 
according to Model 4, holding a competitive election results in a roughly 35% increase in a 
regular exit, whereas the likelihood of foreign-driven violent removal is almost zero right after 
a competitive election. Overall, the results are consistent with my argument that holding a
18The difference is statistically significant (Chi-square=14.61, p<0.01).
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competitive election results in an increase in the likelihood of a regular exit and a decrease 
in the likelihood of foreign intervention.
Moving to analyses using entropy balancing to address the selection problem, Table 3 
presents the results. Consistent with the previous models, I find that regardless of the model, 
competitive elections have a significant, negative effect on post-tenure fates, which means that 
competitive elections are more likely to result in dictators’ safe exits. With regard to 
substantive terms, competitive elections increase the likelihood of autocrats’ safe exit by 
about 34%. Here, it is important to note that entropy balancing only adjusts imbalances in the 
covariates based on observables, and thus there remains a concern about a possible bias due to 
unobservables. However, given the difficulty of applying experimental methods in the current 
study, the entropy balancing method is the best available to improve our understanding about 
the effect of competitive elections on autocrats’ post-tenure fates.
[Table 3 about here]
Further, I consider differential effects of competitive elections on post-tenure fates with 
truncated samples by regime type. Escribà-Folch (2013) finds that autocrats in personalist 
regimes are less likely to have regular exits. While Table 2 shows that autocrats in personalist 
regimes in fact tend not to have regular exits, Table 3 reports that even in personalist regimes, 
autocrats can increase their chance of safe exit, if they hold competitive elections. This 
election effect holds even for other regime types – autocrats in one-party regimes and military 
regimes are more likely to have safe exits once they hold competitive elections. Yet, it is 
important to note that military regimes have large standard errors. This suggests that there is 
more variation in the effect of competitive elections on post-tenure fates in military regimes, 
and other factors should explain the unaccounted variation. Understanding the within-regime 
variation is an area for future research.19
19The only regime type that does not show a statistical significance is monarchy. However, partly because 
monarchy generally do not hold competitive elections, the analyses did not converge.
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5 Conclusion
What happens to dictators who hold competitive elections? I argue that competitive 
elections allow autocrats to retire safely. The statistical analyses provided evidence that 
autocrats are less likely to face violent removal after competitive elections, and thus political 
survival of autocrats after such elections is relatively well assured. As a result, even if 
competitive elections have a destabilizing effect on the regime, and some dictators may have 
to step down shortly after holding a competitive election, it may still pay off to implement 
elections.
The findings indicate that reassurance about a post-tenure fate after a competitive elec-
tion could affect autocrats’ decisions to introduce competitive elections. Previous studies 
argue that a dictator has no choice but to hold a competitive election when a threat of ouster 
becomes imminent (e.g., Geddes 2006). Yet, if a dictator is assured that he can step down 
safely after a competitive election, he should have an incentive to hold such an elec-tion before 
the threat becomes imminent. However, this raises a new dilemma: providing reassurance to 
autocrats may result in political development, but at the cost of immunity to the autocrats 
despite their past human rights violations. This is a difficult choice for human rights activists 
and jurists who want to prosecute dictators who have violated human rights in the past. But 
providing reassurance may be the lesser of two evils if it encourages the autocrat to exit and 
relinquish power. Future research could explore a comparison of dictators with explicit 
reassurances and those without to shed light on the trade-offs between justice and 
liberalization.
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Escribà-Folch, Abel. 2013. “Accountable for What? Regime Types, Performance, and the
Fate of Outgoing Dictators, 1946–2004.” Democratization 20(1):160–185.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Trichotomous Post-tenure Fates 0.184 0.519 2.00 0.00
Polychotomous Post-tenure Fates 0.188 0.534 3.00 0.00
Competitive Election 0.131 0.337 1.00 0.00
One-party 0.463 0.499 1.00 0.00
Military 0.116 0.320 1.00 0.00
Monarchy 0.121 0.326 1.00 0.00
Personalist 0.215 0.411 1.00 0.00
Adjusted HR Violations -0.401 0.950 2.25 -3.13
Age 55.091 12.274 92.00 17.00
Entry Mode 0.405 0.538 0.00 2.00
Non-competitive Election 0.096 0.294 1.00 0.00
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.511 0.266 0.95 0.00
3yr Mean Polity -4.931 4.600 10.00 -10.00
3yr Mean ln(Population) 8.650 1.496 14.07 4.66
3yr Mean ln(GDP per capita) 7.961 1.005 11.48 5.05
Cold War 0.236 0.424 1.00 0.00
Spline1 -291.239 539.031 0.00 -4278
Spline2 -1092.577 2252.739 0.00 -18690
Spline3 -1565.890 3667.340 0.00 -32868
Time in Office 7.588 8.150 47.00 0.00
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Table 2: Multinomial Logit Model: Impact of Competitive Election on Post-tenure Fates
VARIABLES
(1) (2)
Regular vs. Irregular Exit Regular vs. Irregular vs. Foreign Exit
Competitive election 1.329*** 0.386 1.332*** 0.415 -28.339***
(0.227) (0.261) (0.227) (0.264) (0.677)
One-party -0.825** -0.497 -0.827** -0.467 15.333***
(0.342) (0.312) (0.342) (0.315) (5.023)
Military -0.197 1.009*** -0.200 1.006*** 18.170***
(0.416) (0.345) (0.415) (0.348) (4.804)
Personalist -1.459*** 0.247 -1.460*** 0.262 16.559***
(0.447) (0.333) (0.446) (0.339) (5.086)
Monarchy -0.490 -0.197 -0.491 -0.307 16.798***
(0.561) (0.578) (0.560) (0.608) (4.569)
Adjusted HR violations -0.070 -0.259** -0.066 -0.233** -1.438
(0.117) (0.104) (0.117) (0.108) (1.189)
Age 0.051*** 0.021** 0.051*** 0.020** 0.038
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.028)
Entry Mode -0.142 -0.097 -0.141 -0.098 -0.108
(0.213) (0.189) (0.213) (0.193) (0.554)
Non-competitive election 1.095*** 0.002 1.096*** -0.057 0.957
(0.274) (0.354) (0.274) (0.365) (1.177)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.002 -0.095 -0.001 -0.119 1.602
(0.348) (0.352) (0.348) (0.352) (3.148)
3yr Mean Polity 0.006 0.040* 0.006 0.043* -0.230
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.201)
3yr Mean ln(Population) -0.010 -0.202** -0.007 -0.176** -1.327**
(0.084) (0.080) (0.084) (0.081) (0.519)
3yr Mean ln(GDP per capita) -0.040 -0.500*** -0.041 -0.523*** -0.133
(0.126) (0.118) (0.126) (0.118) (0.659)
Cold War -0.171 -0.835*** -0.174 -0.852*** 0.214
(0.211) (0.255) (0.211) (0.258) (1.522)
Spline1 -0.124*** -0.260*** -0.125*** -0.261*** 0.150
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.377)
Spline2 0.029*** 0.061*** 0.030*** 0.061*** -0.026
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.091)
Spline3 -0.002** -0.004*** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Time in Office -1.230*** -2.484*** -1.239*** -2.499*** 2.049
(0.290) (0.307) (0.290) (0.309) (3.312)
Constant -2.986** 5.396*** -2.980** 5.426*** -20.556
(1.278) (1.077) (1.278) (1.073) (0.000)
Observations 2,856 2,856
Log Likelihood -1001.4 -1015.2
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 3: Matching Analyses: Effect of Competitive Election on Post-tenure Fates
Baseline One-party Military Personalist
Regular Exit
1.238*** 1.120*** 1.574* 1.329**
(0.242) (0.398) (0.879) (0.658)
Observations 2856 1356 322 760
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. **<0.05; ***<0.01. All the covariates for the balancing stage are




This figure provides the standardized differences in the means before and after the entropy
balancing. The figure shows that all the covariates are balanced between treated and control
samples after the entropy balancing.
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Reassurance and Competitive Elections
This paper suggests that although dictators’ tenure may shorten after a competitive
election, the election can provide assurance for dictators that they will have a safe exit from
tenure. This Appendix builds on this argument to systematically examine if reassurance
about a post-tenure fate affects autocrats’ decisions to introduce competitive elections. More
specifically, by using simple models, I demonstrate that autocrats with safe exit are likely to
hold a competitive election earlier than the counterparts without.
5.1 Competitive Election without Reassurance
To see how reassurance after competitive election matters, I formalize an election game
between an incumbent dictator and democratic force. First, I simplify the previous studies’
argument that a dictator has no choice but to hold a competitive election in the following
manner (e.g., Geddes 2006). Suppose a situation in which the balance of power between a
dictator and democratic force will become tilted toward the democratic force in the future.
The democratic force is represented by a domestic opposition group and citizens, and backed
by international actors. Given the situation, the game begins with the incumbent’s decision of
whether to hold a competitive election, ADictator = {Election,∼ Election}. If the incumbent
decides to hold the election, he has to step down and may be eventually prosecuted due to
past human rights violations. Conversely, if he does not hold the election, the democratic
force has to decide whether to revolt against the dictator, ADemocratic Force = {Revolt,∼
Revolt}. If it revolts against the dictator, he wins with probability p or loses with probability
1− p, ANature = {DWin,D Lose}. Figure B shows the sequence of the game.
I name each outcome Democratization (Election), Repression (∼ Election,Revolt,D Win),
Execution (∼ Election,Revolt,D Lose), and Status Quo (∼ Election,∼ Revolt). For sim-
plicity, suppose that the payoff ordering for a dictator is: StatusQuo ≻ Repression ≻
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Democratization ≻ Execution. The payoff ordering for the democratic force is: Democratization ≻
Execution ≻ Status Quo ≻ Repression. Using backward induction, the value of p shapes
the expected payoff associated with a decision for the democratic force to revolt against
the dictator. First, consider a situation in which the dictator’s probability of winning a
revolt is high such that the expected payoff for the democratic force in the lower subgame is:
E(Status Quo) ≻ E(Repression, Execution). In this case, the democratic force will always
choose ∼ Revolt over Revolt. Since the payoff for Status Quo is greater than the payoff for
Democratization for the dictator, he will not hold an election. The equilibrium for this case
is thus: {∼ Election,∼ Revolt} and democratization will not emerge. In contrast, if the
probability for the dictator to win the conflict is low such that the expected payoff for the
democratic force is: E(Repression,Execution) ≻ E(Status Quo), the democratic force will
always choose to revolt against the dictator. In this case, the dictator must decide whether
to hold a competitive election. Since the payoff for Democratization is greater than the
expected payoff for Repression and Execution for the dictator, he will agree to hold an
election and the outcome Democratization will materialize. From this, in this game, we can
see that democratization will emerge when the revolutionary threat from democratic force
is high (p is low). In other words, if the revolutionary threat is credible enough, a dictator
chooses to democratize the country.
5.2 Competitive Election with Reassurance
I next incorporate the possibility for a dictator to stay in power after competitive elec-
tions – I call this possibility reassurance. In this game, if a dictator decides to hold
a multiparty election, the democratic force has to decide whether it reassures the dic-
tator that he can have immunity from prosecution and/or execution after the election,
ADemocratic Force = {Reassurance,∼ Reassurance}. As with the empirical analysis, I assume
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that reassurance is only granted on condition of holding a competitive election. Figure C
shows the game. The payoff ordering for a dictator is assumed as follows: LiberalDictator ≻
Status Quo ≻ Repression ≻ Democratization ≻ Execution, where Liberal Dictator is the
outcome in which the dictator becomes a guardian of democracy in the country after holding
a competitive election. The payoff ordering LiberalDictator ≻ StatusQuo is justified, since
the balance of power between a dictator and democratic force will become tilted toward the
democratic force in the future – the dictator is better off introducing a competitive election
now and stepping down as a guardian of democracy than retaining the status quo and de-
mocratizing in the future when the balance of power is already against the dictator.
In this game, the outcome Liberal Dictator will emerge when the democratic force offers
reassurance to the dictator that he will have immunity after the election.20 If reassurance
is ensured, the equilibrium is achieved independently of the lower-right subgame: the rev-
olutionary threat does not have to be credible. On the other hand, if the democratic force
does not give the dictator reassurance after democratization, the dictator will not agree to
hold an election and a different equilibrium will emerge depending on p.21 In this case, the
dictator agrees to democratize only if the revolutionary threat becomes credible.
In a nutshell, from the two different games – one without reassurance and the other
with reassurance – one can see that autocrats introduce a competitive election even without
a serious threat against the regime when the following conditions are met: (1) a dictator
is assured that he can step down safely after a competitive election, and (2) the dictator
expects that their strength will be weakened in the future. By using the simple models, this
Appendix showed that autocrats with reassurance would introduce a competitive election at a
20In other words, the dictator holds an election when the payoff ordering for democratic force is:
Liberal Dictator ≻ Democratization ≻ Execution ≻ Status Quo ≻ Repression.
21The payoff ordering for democratic force is assumed: Democratization ≻ Execution ≻
Liberal Dictator ≻ Status Quo ≻ Repression.
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relatively early stage of transition process, whereas counterparts without reassurance resist
democratization demands until a revolutionary threat becomes credible. This eventually
suggests the following reassurance dilemma: providing reassurance to autocrats may result
in political development, but, on the other hand, immunity or a safe post-tenure fate has to
be provided to the autocrats despite their past human rights violations.
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